The U.S. memcon of the one-on-one meeting at the Kremlin (Document 19) features repeated Yeltsin objections: I see nothing but humiliation for Russia if you proceed . Bush, among others). December 20, 2017, The US Betrayed Russia, but It Is Not News Thats Fit to PrintThe Nation And militarily, the fact that the largest grouping of military forces in the world would advance to within close proximity of Russian borders requires a cardinal reconceptualization of all defense conceptions, reconfiguration of the armed forces, reconsideration of all military theaters (districts), deployment of additional infrastructures, re-deployments of large military contingents, changes in contingency plans and of the character of the military-educational preparations, even though the report says it is understood that the alliance does not intend to launch a strike against Russia. December 12, 2017, Summits Book Wins Choice Award Outstanding Academic Title 2017 ". President Viktor Yushchenko, the disastrous 2005 election winner backed by the U.S., unsuccessfully pushed his country to join the . The different perceptions or even the hardening of positions after the fact about what those conversations meant underscore the real issue. The secretary tells Kozyrev that he believed that this met Russias requirements. Christopher does not directly address Kozyrevs concern about the decision about the expansion, but, misleadingly, lets it sound as if PFP is the alternative for the time being. Woerner said that when he met with Yeltsin and invited Russia to take part in the Partnership for Peace, "his attitude seemed generally favorable.". Scholars and policymakers continue to debate whether the West, and in particular the United States, promised the Russians that NATO would not enlarge to include former Warsaw Pact nations. Aspin states that the main focus will be on NATO expansion since a number of countries were pushing for NATO membership. He also affirms the Clinton administrations support for the Partnership for Peace program. Yeltsin was echoing calls made a year earlier when Mikhail Gorbachev proposed the Soviet Union join the North Atlantic Alliance. Another such occasion occurred four months later, when Clinton invited Yeltsin to meet him at Hyde Park, N.Y., the birthplace of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. NATO expansion was always going to be a painful experience for Russian leaders, but they evidently concluded that they had no alternative than to grin and bear it. Bush. Russia could be richly rewarded for going along with a NATO deal. Gores talking points for his meeting with Yeltsin (in the latters hospital room) (Document 16) and the Russian record of Gores meeting with Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin on December 14, 1994, (Document 14) show the Americans emphasizing there would be no rapid NATO expansion, only a gradual, deliberate process with no surprises, moving in tandem with the closest possible understanding between the U.S. and Russia, and no new NATO members in 1995, a year of Russian parliamentary elections. Six months before the election, Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed. Yeltsins relief was palpable. In this excerpt, Senator Sam Nunn responds to Russian concerns about NATO expansion saying that in his view expansion of NATO must follow, and not be ahead of, the process of expansion of the EU membership, which corresponds to the Russian vision of a long-term horizon of expansion. Clinton refused. NATO enlargement has provided enormous benefits to a part of Europe historically beset by insecurity owing to its location between Germany and Russia. Several Russian Phone Calls, In his letter, Mr. Yeltsin said: "This will contribute to creating a climate of mutual understanding and trust, strengthening stability and cooperation on the European continent. The U.S. green light document notes that almost immediately, however, Moscow got busy refining its position. Yeltsins letter to Clinton on September 15, 1993, (Document 4) expressed uneasiness over the discussion of quantitative expansion and strongly advocated a pan-European security system instead of NATO. But for me to agree to the borders of NATO expanding towards those of Russia that would constitute a betrayal on my part of the Russian people. For his part, Clinton insisted that gradual, steady, measured NATO expansion would happen: You can say you dont want it speeded up Ive told you were not going to do that but dont ask us to slow down either, or well just have to keep saying no. Clinton also assured Yeltsin, I wont support any change that undermines Russias security or redivides Europe, and urged Yeltsin to join the Partnership for Peace. In 1999, Russia condemned the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Case N. F-2008-02356. Rather, it was because within the U.S. government itself, there was tremendous uncertainty about the best path forward. In the end, however, the bureaucracy coalesced around a more gradual approach that also provided for a parallel NATO-Russia track designed to address Russian concerns about being left out in the cold. "We believe that the eastward expansion of NATO is a mistake and a serious one at that," Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first post-Soviet president, told reporters at a 1997 news conference with US . By contrast, many in Moscow (especially since the ascension of Vladimir Putin to power) view the security of Russia as dependent on the insecurity of its neighbors. Partnership for Peace was not the answer, particularly once enlargement became the prize for most of the countries in the region. The partnership would not involve full NATO membership. 35+ YEARS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTION, FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight Reports, When Washington Assured Russia NATO Would Not Expand, The US Betrayed Russia, but It Is Not News Thats Fit to Print, Summits Book Wins Choice Award Outstanding Academic Title 2017. Given the power disparities, the differences would be hard to reconcile. After all, we are no longer adversaries, we are partners. Nevertheless, the possibility of Russia joining the military alliance has surfaced multiple times throughout NATO's 70-year existence. When Evgeny Primakov becomes foreign minister in January 1996, one of the very first issues he has to deal with is NATO expansion. The not-yet-declassified Clinton-Yeltsin memcon from September 27 and the others from 1994 are the subject of pending declassification review requests at the Clinton Library. Yeltsin has most likely already been briefed by Kozyrev about his conversation with the secretary of state and his assurance about PFP and not membership. He emphasizes that NATO expansion is not at the moment perceived as a military threat, but as an establishment of new dividing lines in Europe, which will inevitably lead to a slide into a new confrontation, undermining of trust between Russia and the Western States. He disagrees with the rationale for expansion and refers to the assurances that were given to Soviet and Russian leaders in 1990-1991 that NATO would not expand an inch to the East. Primakov concludes rather forcefully: We are talking about a decision, consequences of which will define the European configuration for decades in the future. My reaction is that nothing is excluded, and we will have time enough to develop relations.". To achieve this goal, Russia will have to go a longer way, than many . The declassified U.S. account of one key conversation on October 22, 1993, (Document 8) shows Secretary of State Warren Christopher assuring Yeltsin in Moscow that the Partnership for Peace was about including Russia together with all European countries, not creating a new membership list of just some European countries for NATO; and Yeltsin responding, this is genius!, Christopher later claimed in his memoir that Yeltsin misunderstood perhaps from being drunk the real message that the Partnership for Peace would in fact lead to gradual expansion of NATO;[1] but the actual American-written cable reporting the conversation supports subsequent Russian complaints about being misled. At a news conference, he chided the news media for predicting that the meeting might end up as a "disaster.". His even more detailed analysis is in WarOnTheRocks, Promises Made, Promises Broken: What Yeltsin Was Told About NATO in 1993 and Why It Matters, July 12, 2016, Link. the broader, higher goal [is] European security, unity and integration a goal I know you share.[5], But the Russians were hearing in the fall of 1994 that new Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Richard Holbrooke was speeding up NATO expansion discussions, even initiating a NATO study in November of the how and why of new members. In his book,In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era, Christopher writes that when he told Yeltsin about the Partnership for Peace, Yeltsin called it a stroke of genius. Christopher then reports that he explained that a NATO enlargement process would be long-term and evolutionary and Yeltsin responded, This really is a great idea. Similarly, Talbott in his memoir,The Russia Hand, says that when Christopher explained that the United States was not going forward at that time with enlargement but instead the Partnership for Peace, Yeltsin didnt even let him finish, calling it brilliant.. 2130 H Street, NW In the MemCon, this specific point is not in quotation marks as is the case with a number of the other comments that were reported. They argue that the negotiating record of the past 2 1/2 years -- going back to September 1994, when Clinton first broached the idea of NATO expansion to a suspicious Yeltsin -- supports their view that the "Boris-Bill" connection was crucial. Today we are raising a question of Russia's membership in NATO, however regarding it as a long-term political aim.". The idea of partnership for all rather than membership for some was, said Yeltsin, a great idea, really great. It stated: "Yeltsin is six years older than the average life expectancy of the Russian male (58) and has now had two heart attacks in three and a half months. This is about the best one can do to give credence to the Russian position, given that historianMark Kramer combed through the documentary evidenceto argue as I did in 1999 that the 1990 conversation was limited to discussion about unified Germanys status in NATO. NATO is a factor, too, of course, but NATO should evolve into a political organization., The Russian declassified documents from closed Duma hearings (Document 18) and internal memos in the 1990s (Document 25) detail the Russian objections that NATO expansion would (1) threaten Russian security, (2) undermine the idea of inclusive European security that Gorbachev and Yeltsin both sought, and (3) draw a new line across Europe. Yeltsin showed only limited acquiescence when Clinton came to Moscow in May 1995 to mark the 50th anniversary of victory over Hitler in World War II. When Washington Assured Russia NATO Would Not ExpandThe American Conservative We plan to have full and frank discussions with Russia at every stage of this process. In response, Rybkin stresses that [t]he assurances you gave regarding NATO expansion are very important, and implicitly links the process of NATO expansion with ratification of START II. When it was his turn to speak, Mr. Afanasyevsky stood up and read some prepared remarks, welcoming this new cooperation between former foes, and then read a letter from Mr. Yeltsin. At an international conference in Budapest, the Russian leader blasted the very notion of NATO expansion, arguing that there was a risk of transforming the Cold War into a "cold peace.". Kozyrev is concerned about any expansion, and he asked pointedly, whether there would not be two or three new members now? Christopher says no and only talks about an eventual new NATO membership as something that would happen in the distant future. Christopher is taken to Yeltsins country house, Zavidovo, for a meeting that lasts only 45 minutes. U.S. Department of State. Thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, we have thedeclassified memorandum of conversation(MemCon), which sheds much more light on what was said in October 1993 (and in what order) than do thememoirs of ChristopherandClintons chief Russia hand, Strobe Talbott. The memo inaccurately described one comment by Hans-Dietrich Genscher as unilateral and only applying to the former GDR, when in fact State Department and British diplomatic cables at the time (February 1990) showed Genscher specifically and repeatedly referred both to the former GDR and to Poland and Hungary as countries that might want to join NATO. Apparently, in 1991, it was also a long term goal of President Yeltsin's for Russia to join NATO.. In return, Albright hinted that the alliance was ready to make a statement ruling out the use of old Warsaw Pact nuclear storage sites by NATO. Referring to their last conversation during the late September summit in Washington, Yeltsin writes that we have agreed with you that there would be no surprises, that first we should pass through this stage of partnership, whereas issues of further evolution of NATO should not be decided without due account to the opinion and interests of Russia. The Russian leader warns that discussions with prospective members and developing timetables will be interpreted and not only in Russia as the beginning of a new split of Europe.. James Goldgeier is a Robert Bosch senior visiting fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, and a professor of international relations at the School of International Service at American University, where he served as dean from 2011-17. Mikhail Gorbachev announced the end of the Soviet Union, and thus his presidency, on Christmas Day 1991, and U.S. President George H.W. Despite the pleas for NATO membership made by key Central European leaders such as Czech president Vaclav Havel and Polish president Lech Walesa in a meeting with President Bill Clinton, the majority of officials in the U.S. government did not favor such a move. Date/Case ID: 04 MAY 2000 200000982, Charg dAffaires and future Ambassador to Russia James Collins sends Secretary Christopher a briefing cable in advance of his visit to Moscow where he is expected to meet with Yeltsin and Kozyrev. Although Yeltsin and Clinton had agreed in principle to sign the NATO-Russia agreement in Paris on May 27, there was still no deal when Albright went to Moscow at the beginning of May. This was not a promise either, but it cemented for the Russians the narrative that regardless of what the United States claimed in conversations with their leaders, it would maximize the American position without regard for Russian interests. State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), Fond 10026, Opis 1. Had they been left out of European institutions, they may well have faced the same insecurities and struggles that Ukraine and Georgia face today. Sarotte combined primary sources from German, British, French, and Soviet files, together with the James Baker Papers at Princeton and documents released under the U.S. FOIA to the National Security Archive, to show the German unification discussions of NATO were not narrowly limited to the territory of the former East Germany, that highest-level head of state and foreign minister meetings were the main venue rather than the Two-Plus-Four negotiations for talks on the future European security system, and that the American pre-fab solution of maintaining NATO set the stage for longer term Russian resentments. At a private lunch in late September 1994, Clinton told Yeltsin that NATO would expand, but he argued there was no timetable. He says that although every country has the sovereign right to choose its political and military alliances, Eastern Europe and the Baltics should not speculate about the mythical Russian threat. In his opinion, European security should be collective, not bloc-oriented, relying instead on all-European structures. They talk about Russia-NATO cooperation, joint work on non-proliferation, and bilateral military-to-military relations. A week later, the two presidents spoke on the phone and agreed to a meeting in early 1997. Flanagan, a Bush 41 veteran who stayed on into the Clinton administration, had already published a journal essay in 1992 floating NATO expansion ideas. The Primakov documents speak to the fundamental Moscow understanding of the end-of-the-Cold-War arrangements, that Germany would unify in NATO in 1990 only with the inclusion of the USSR (and then Russia) in subsequent European security structures. MA: There were basically two rival bodies that were both elected democratically in Soviet times. As the U.S. charg daffaires in Moscow, James Collins, warned Secretary of State Christopher just before his trip to meet Yeltsin in October 1993 (Document 6), the NATO issue is neuralgic to the Russians. Christopher met Yeltsin at the latters dacha in Zavidovo for 45 minutes on October 22. Psychologically, expanding NATO rather than building a new security system would prolong the existence of Cold War bloc thinking and mistrust. "They wanted to be part of that secure, stable prosperous west that Russia was out of at the time . This State Department cable provides briefing points to use with allies in describing Vice President Gores trip to Moscow, and contains several striking passages on what the Russians said to the Gore group about NATO expansion. This Yeltsin letter to Clinton lays out Yeltsins strong stance against rapid expansion and his concern about NATOs apparent path of geographical and numerical expansion rather than transformation into a political organization.
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